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Conceptual Introduction 
This article is inspired by theories of space, power and knowledge in a 
spurious way but could not have been written had I not attempted some 
engagement with these important epistemological understandings of how 
humans and space interconnect. As Foucault commented ‘it is surprising 
how long the problem of space took time to emerge as a historic-political 
problem’.1 I must admit I am one of those who took some time to acquaint 
themselves with ‘this problem’. 
The result of this short foray into concepts of space and power is an 
attempt to present in this article collaborative resistance in the history of 
modern Palestine as a kind of a third space modality which is based on two 
parameters: distance and time. I ask how far is the distance one is willing to 
travel out of one’s ethnic, ideological or national comfort zone in order to 
create a joint space and how much time is one willing to spend inside this 
space? 
In third space I refer here to the notions which were discussed ably by 
Alessandro Soja in his seminal work from 1996, Thirdspace2, as well as to 
the conceptualizations of space in history as they emerged, among other 
places, in the critique of Henri Lefebvre on Foucault’s position on spatial 
conceptualization.3 Lefebvre saw Foucault’s interventions on space as 
celebrating individualism and neglecting collective effort to engage within a 
given space. Lefebvre’s distinction, based on two different usages of the 
tern power in French, between power that knowledge serves and 
knowledge that refuses to acknowledge power is the main basis for this 
critique that exposed for Marxists the absence of resistance in the 
Foucaudian ‘spiral forays’ as Soja called them.4 
Unlike Foucault, Lefebvre wrote in an accessible manner and hence his 
critique seemed flippant to Soja but at least it was clear. Lefebvre claimed 
Foucault did not bridge the gap between the space of the philosophers and 
that of the real people (which would be another example for a ‘sanctified 
opposition’ Foucault ridiculed as being part of the way discourse governs 
our life).5  
But I found Lefebvre’s The Production of Space in particular useful here. For 
him space is ‘fundamentally bound up with social reality’ whereby 
individuals are constantly preoccupied with producing and defining their 
space.6 For him the space is produced by people’s experience living in it; 
people’s representations of it and by the symbols associated with it.  In his 
jargon there are three elements in the analysis of space: spatial practice, 
representations of space and spaces of representations.  For Lefebvre space 
can be either contested constantly or shared.  
It is on the margins of this debate – of how to share third spaces - that I 
offer to look at space, as a multilayered spot which is defined by affinities, 
ideologies, identities and life’s requirements. This matrix of impacts help to 
illustrate both what does collaboration in resistance means in cases such as 
Palestine as well as the role such transition from one space to the other 
signify for reconciliation efforts there and elsewhere.  
It is this very liberally defined third space, the peripheral place where 
people out of power, challenge power or at least attempt not to succumb to 
power which either identifies them as the Other, the periphery or claims to 
speak in their name - as nationalism does - that this article focuses on. 
To simplify the picture we can think of a space in the context of the 
dichotomies that existed in Palestine, ever since the arrival of Zionism 
there in 1882, as diametrically opposed locations that are segregated 
sometimes conceptually or verbally, and as time physically.  The space of 
‘us’ and the ‘others’ appears first as a Zionist vision, then as a strategy and 
eventually as a reality. The Palestinian designation of ‘our space’ is far more 
elusive and changes in reaction to the assertive Zionist demands of carving 
real and imaginary gated and exclusive spaces in Palestine.  
A third space in this respect is one which Zionists forsake their safe, and 
later after 1948, hegemonic spaces they occupy and substitute them with a 
third space realities – where they lose the hegemony. There is also a 
historical trajectory that locates eventually them in the space of the other, if 
collaboration in resistance to their own space is what motivated them. 
For the Palestinians, in parallel history that began in 1882, opting for a 
third space would be a venture out of the familiar and more secure 
national, and in many ways, anti-colonial, space into a post-colonial, 
discourse or visions, without yet the realization of such a reality. As the 
colonization of Palestine continues until today; not surprisingly this hardly 
occurs. So we should focus on the colonisers’ ability to create a third space 
of a kind.  
Where Palestinians did venture out of their own national space was when 
under existential circumstances they found themselves in as a result of the 
Zionist colonization of Palestine. The shared physically spaces with the 
newcomers at various moments of the history of the conflict in Palestine; in 
some cases this was a collaboration of a kind. When these were sites of join 
industrial action of business enterprises – and there were quite a few –
those present in such a space were asked to challenge  dominant paradigms 
or interpretations of reality that regularly shaped the unique conditions in 
colonized and Zionised Palestine. 
A good way of exemplifying a third space realties as collaboration is to 
point to the lack of such collaboration in the various attempts to conduct a 
political dialogue between the Jewish settlers and the native population of 
Palestine. Almost all of these attempts since 1882 and until today (apart 
from the Oslo accord of 1993) were forced upon the two communities. But 
more importantly they were efforts to solidify two spaces and create a 
buffer between them rather than seeking any collaboration. And therefore 
the liberal Zionist historiography that depicts such dialogues as 
collaboration is misleading to my mind.7  There are two interrelated points 
of critique on this approach. The first is that the representation of the 
conflict as a whole as one raging between two national movement, and not 
as anti-colonialist struggle, is questionable. Secondly, even if one accepts 
the need for such political dialogue, third space is created when ‘peace’ 
breaks out or is envisaged as the end result of intensive diplomatic efforts 
to settle feuds on land and power.   This article is written under the 
conviction that the conflict in Palestine is a colonialist one and thus the only 
collaboration we are looking for is anti and post colonialist. 
The basic paradigm that enabled a third space is the one that is attempted 
while there is a mutual recognition of an imbalanced reality in our case 
spaces which are interlocked in oppressive relationship between a 
colonizer and colonized, or invaders and invaded.  The journey into the 
third space for the member of the settler community is powerful – it 
negates dimensions such as justice and Moral Rights – on which the settling 
project was based; even if not necessarily motivated by them. The native 
moves into the third space in recognition of the possible heterogeneous 
nature of the settler community and even acceptance of some agency for 
the settlers in determining the future which may produce a native 
invitation for the settler to stay. As the time passes by, as we shall see in 
Israel and Palestine, it would become more difficult for the settlers’ next 
generations to envisage joint spaces, due to the impressive success to 
create an exclusive one while for the Palestinians the next generations of 
settlers would drive home the message of permanency and a need to 
include them in a any future vision.  
 
Was Bi-nationalism Collaboration? 
 
The weakness of the settler community in the early years, the doubts and 
the residues of more universal ideologies that once shaped the move out of 
Europe, all motivated a handful of Zionists to look for a different frame in 
their relationship with the native population, although one should not 
exaggerate the scope of this phenomenon.  
Similarly, these very attributes of the settlers in the beginning of their 
project can explain why the local native population could believe in their 
ability of returning the clock backwards; namely pushing the settlers back 
to their countries of origin, as quite few anti-colonial movements 
succeeded in doing. Such a conviction acted as an disincentive to move to 
the third space of collaboration in struggle. But the with a third generation 
of settlers,  the colonial movement becomes in the eyes of the natives a 
settler colonialist one; namely both pragmatically, and possibly ethically, 
the vision of expulsion is waning and eventually disappears completely.   
 
The first significant endeavor to create a third space of a kind was 
attempted by the Palestine Communist Party. The trajectory of this party 
from an all-Jewish party on its inception to a bi-national party in 1937 - 
when Palestinians were admitted to the party continued after 1948 in a 
different orientation. It transformed from a bi-national outfit into 
Palestinian national party supported by Communist and socialist Jews. 
However, its discourse, platforms and positionalities  were still loyal to bi-
nationalism.8  
The communist party during the mandatory period was involved in 
industrial action where the action itself, strike or protest, was short lived, 
and indeed while it occurred settlers and natives were on par demanding 
the same agenda from the British mandatory government or from Jewish 
and Palestinian employers.  This joint labour history was already recorded 
and commended by writers such as Zachary Lockman, Lev Greenberg, 
David De Freis, Debby Bernstein and many others.9  It is worthwhile 
recanting here some of its more significant landmarks in the mandatory 
history.  But as this article I hope will clarify, in order to examine the issues 
of collaboration in resistance – the litmus test is the attitude to the 
colonization of Palestine and not to its capitalization or rapid 
modernization. Invaders were not welcome even if they suggested new 
ways of improving the conditions of live and work of the farmers and 
labourers of Palestine. They included joint strikes for better working 
conditions in sites such as the cement factory in Haifa and the British 
owned train workshops in the 1920s; the privately owned buses and trucks 
companies in the early 1930s and even in 1946 when Palestine was already 
burning at the very end of the mandate, Jews and Palestinian junior clerks 
went on a strike against the government’s payment policies.10  
In some, but not in all of these junctures the Communist party played a role. 
But its moment of truth came in 1947 and it did not pass it, to put it mildly, 
with flying colours.  
The party faced an impossible paradox which it could not solve. It was 
impossible to maintain for long a Marxist Jewish-Arab party line that 
accepted the national rights of Jews in Palestine (and regarded the Jewish 
action against the British mandatory authorities as anti-colonialist) on the 
one hand at the same time joining in the Palestinian struggle against Zionist 
dispossession under British umbrella, on the other. 
When this proved too much the party split on the eve of the end of the 
mandate. The Jewish dominated the communist party, supported the UN 
1947 partition of Palestine, the sale of Soviet weapons to the Jewish forces 
that ethnically cleansed Palestine while the Palestinians Defense League 
that left the party jointed the abortive Palestinian effort to protect Palestine 
from this dispossession.  
Obviously for the vast majority of the Palestinian members in the 
communist party at the very last moment before the creation of the Jewish 
state bi-nationality was not a model for collaboration in resistance. But the 
position of these very activists would change drastically after the creation 
of the state and they would become the heralds, and principal supporters, 
of the two states’ solutions in which Palestinians were at best asked to give 
up eighty percent of Palestine for a Jewish State (be it one that was 
supposed to respect the rights of the Palestinians in it as a national 
minority).  
The communist party’s insistence, reflected also in its support for the UN 
partition plan of November 1947, to grant parity to both national 
movements defeated these higher levels of cooperation in the liberation 
struggle. Accepting Zionism as a national movement, defeated any 
achievement and elation gained by striking together against the mandatory 
government’s payment policy or even the exclusivist nature of the Jewish 
trade unions.  
However since laobur rights and issues are such a crucial part of life in any 
society, the communist party’s focus on these issues after 1948 kept it alive 
as a political outfit; even after the collapse of the USSR.  But in an 
incremental and exponential line, the discourse, as well as the action of the 
party members and leaders had to be imbedded in the Palestinian national 
movement and distance the party from Zionism and Jewish nationalism.  
The agenda was class orientated and social but it remained relevant 
because it was part of the more general anti-colonialist Palestinian 
struggle, including inside Israel, against Zionism.  The inability to say this in 
public, which among other difficulties could also lead to outlawing of the 
party in Israel today, is a discursive and pragmatic issue, not one of 
essence.  
So I hope the readers agree with me that the communist party as well as 
the history of joint industrial action in mandatory Palestine, and to certain 
extent - also this is much rarer - in Israel, is part of the history of 
collaboration in resistance in Palestine and it was achieved through short 
periods in which joint spaces of action were created. It also produced some 
joint marriages, which in the exclusivist and segregationist Zionist vision 
and practice was and still is dreaded and almost not existent. The fact that I 
know all these couples, including those who alas passed away, justify Yuval 
Yonai’s assumption that there is no community for research here due to the 
paucity of the phenomenon.11 But none the less, marriage is a double edged 
struggle and in an apartheid-like reality a third space worth integrating 
into this alternative history. 
But while accepting that bi-national cooperation failed to be easily fitted 
into a collaborative paradigm of joint struggle it does not necessarily imply 
that today such a cooperation is equally unsuitable. This is reflected today 
in the debate among those who believe that the one state solution is the 
best way forward in Israel and Palestine but cannot agree on the model the 
unitary state would adhere to: a bi-national one in respect of the two 
national spaces created or a democratic state with equal citizenships that 
create a new non-national space all together.12  
 
The Bizarre Case of Brit Shalom 
 
There was another outfit that attempted the bi-national paradigm in the 
mandatory period, Brit Shalom, later renamed Ihud.  It was founded in 1925 
by a group of Jewish settlers,  most of whom were academics and 
intellectuals. They believed in the creation of mandatory state, in which the 
Jewish and ‘Arab’ communities would be defined a national autonomies, 
enjoying the same equal rights under the British sovereignty.  Like all 
mandatory systems at the time, this mandated state was a transitional 
phase meant to lead to full independence of a future bi-national state.  
 
In many ways these Jews were the successors of Ahad Ha’am (Asher 
Ginzburg); the Jewish intellectual that suggested that Zionism would only 
be implemented as a spiritual and cultural – but not political – project.  He 
also suggested not to continue with the project unless the local population 
consented to it.  
However, it should be stressed that the members of this group saw 
themselves as Zionists with a better idea of how to implement the ideals of 
the movement.  Among them one could find luminaries such as Martin 
Buber, Gershom Scholem, Hugo Bergman and many others.13  
It only had a handful of members and due to the animosity of the Jewish 
community around them and lack of interest of the Palestinian population 
in their ideas the movement was dismantled in 1933. It tried in the last 
days of the Mandate to resurrect with a different name Ihud, which even 
succeeded in recruiting a member of the leading Palestinian family in the 
land, the Husaynis (and who alas was murdered for that) – but it was also 
short lived and disappeared.14  
 
But it is a fascinating historical case study for our examination. As in the 
case of the communist party the first and second spaces, so to speak, had 
ethically and politically an equal standing in the eyes of the Jews 
propagating bi-nationalism. When such an idea is offered during the first 
generation of settlers it has very little attraction within an anti-colonialist 
struggle. This did not mean that cohabitation or accommodation, from the 
native’s point of view was impossible. Provided they came as asylum 
seekers, or even immigrates, but not as ideologues seeking to dispossess 
that native population. 
This range of possibilities was recognized by Mahatma Ghandi. The leading 
figure in Brit Shalom, the Jewish philosopher, Martin Buber, was seeking 
Ghandi’s endorsement to the basic idea of Zionism as a movement that has 
a right to settle in Palestine but should not harm the rights of the naïve 
people. A glimpse into the problematique of our subject matter can be 
gathered from re-reading the correspondence between these two great 
men.15 One cannot think of someone more amiable for a possible 
coexistence in mandatory Palestine than this Jewish philosopher.  Both the 
correspondence between the two and the very nature and purpose of Brit 
Shalom highlight the paradigmatic predicament I have outlined earlier on.  
Gandhi refused to accept Buber’s claim that by their presence in Palestine 
the Jewish settlers established a moral right they had to the land, although 
he respected Buber’s additional assertion that this right did not justify any 
dispossession or challenging the right of the indigenous people to the land. 
Gandhi was only too familiar with the gist of moral justifications Western 
colonialists provided for taking over other people’s land and wished Buber 
to accept the very immorality of colonization on the one hand, and the 
noble desire of Jews to see a safe haven from persecution anywhere in the 
world, including in Palestine, on the other.  
Thus even the paradigm of Buber did not leave much hope for a joint 
struggle although it was benign and peaceful one. Similarly Brit Shalom was 
based on a certain parity for a joint  struggle for the sake of both national 
movements. The idea of a bi-national state was put forward by these 
intellectuals when the Zionist settlement was a minority and was not yet 
certain of international recognition.  
This is why it is so different from bi-nationalism today, where the option of 
expunging the settler community are non existent; nor are they realistic or 
desired. Bi-nationalism today from the vantage point of power and 
possession, is a dramatic self-dismantling the settlers’ regime, not 
existence. Accepting this paradigm today demands significant concessions 
from the native national liberation movement – most of important of which 
to accept whatever is incurred in recognizing your invader as a national 
movement on your land.  It should be noted that several Palestinians, 
among them the late Edward Said, where willing to create that third space 
by supporting the model of a bi-national state as the end result of a 
reconciliation process. 
But even today bi-nationalism as a third space poses serious question. It 
applies a parity to a place where a century of disparity – namely 
colonization and dispossession. Does this meant that the history of this 
disparity is forgotten, absolved as a result of accepting the bi-national 
model?  Can this paradigm return, or compensate for, what the invasion 
and dispossession robbed to its lawful owners  - while recognizing which 
part of the past realities cannot be returned or rectified? Only if bin-
nationalism as a political outfit can be respond favourably to these queries, 
it may stand a chance. 
A good example for such a realization of the bi-national model would be the 
future interrelation between the Palestinian refugees’ right of return, which 
would have to be respected, and the continued right of Jews to immigrate 
to Palestine, which would have to be negotiated with the Palestinian side. It 
is in a way a third space of social and cultural cohabitation on a bi-national 
basis, while recognizing the national Palestinian character and nature of 
the country. 
 
 
Alternative Models of Collaboration in the post 1948 Era. 
  
In the past the bi-national model failed to absorb genuinely with the basic 
reality Zionism created – a dispossessed Palestine and the making of an 
exclusive Jewish space there. It was very difficult to argue, at least morally, 
in the early stages of the Zionist colonization, against the only decent 
solution for the settler and invader – to return to their home countries.  
And yet life is more complex and insoluble paradoxes that need not always 
to be reconciled and thus the third spaces created by Palestinian and 
Jewish truck drivers. Industrial workers and junior clerks, were positive 
aspects of a fragmented and oppressed realities. Sixty five years later these 
third spaces become inspirational models for the future.  
Indeed it is the premise of this article is that such paradigmatic positions of 
collaboration in resistance have a certain fluency, to the point of 
dramatically transforming, within changing historical circumstances.  The 
Palestinian struggle had to change given the dispossession of Palestine in 
1948 and the fragmentation geographically of the Palestinian people that 
inevitably produced also different strategies of survival and struggle while 
adhering to some consensual precepts and aspirations.  
But this is not a clear cut position. It is very difficult to accept that a 
liberation movement would wholeheartedly collaborate with anyone for 
the liberation of fifth of the homeland while leaving half of the people in 
exile. 
For the Palestinian resistance movement that emerged in and around the 
refugee camps and adopted third world liberation ideologies and praxis 
there was little interest in collaboration with vast Jewish Israeli 
constituency as the basic aim was to transform radically the nature of the 
state and in many ways try and bring the historical clock backwards as was 
stated in the two PLO charters of the late 1960s – bring it back to the 
juncture before the arrival of Jewish settlers in the land. 
This ideological premise changed somewhat in the very early 1970s. 
Palestinian Liberation struggle included a new concept that allowed for 
cooperation with what was already then defined as progressive forces in 
Israel. There was an interesting difference between the main Palestinian 
organization, the Fatah’s take on this issue and the more left outfits’ stance 
such as that adopted by the PFLP and PDFLP. 
The Fatah developed a stages’ strategy for liberation, which led it to accept 
later on the idea of a two states solution. But the Fatah’s idea was 
functional: you liberate what you can now and wait until a better 
opportunity. 
The two states’ solution, as I have shown in an article in this very journal, 
was born in post 1967 Israel and was the brainchild of the Zionist left.  Both 
views accepted that the Palestinian state would be stretched over 22 per 
cent of Palestine – but the Zionist left, and later the Zionist center and right 
which accepted the idea – demanded that this would a finite solution. It is 
possible that some elements in the Fatah accepted that interpretation as 
well – time will tell.  
It is however doubtful if one can call this interaction a form of collaborative 
struggle. It was more akin to information exchange and a joint effort to 
build a lobby inside Israel for the idea of two states solution that became a 
corner stone for the Left Zionist groups centered mainly around two 
political parties the communist party and a left Zionist party, Meretz. These 
connections served eventually the more systematized connection between 
the PLO and the Israeli government towards the Oslo accord, facilitated not 
by these very contacts, but rather by the regional and global changes that 
saw the USA become the sole superpower in the area and the elimination of 
a strong front on non-aligned regimes aided by the Soviet union that in the 
past rejected such cooperation.  
Pragmatism on both sides should not be mistaken for collaboration in the 
struggle and in fact because it was not that, however genuine the relations 
between the Fatah and left Zionist individuals and organizations were, the 
whole process of contact, and eventually the so called peace process, were 
in the main a cynical Israeli ploy to substitute an increasingly unfavorable  
internationally occupation with a continued occupation under the guise of a 
so called peace process that led to nowhere.  It is clear in retrospect that for 
the PLO this was not the intended or coveted result of this contact and 
some of the frustration of the way the negotiations developed and the 
reality they produced – including the transformation of a liberation 
organization like the Fatah into a security sub-contractor of Israel in the 
occupied territories - led to the last attempt at armed struggle by the Fatah 
(together with the Hamas that rejected this paradigm from a political 
Islamist point of view – although never broadcasting any clear alternative ) 
in the second Intifada. 
 
The Genuine Third Space 
 
A different model was attempted by anti-Zionist individuals and outfits 
inside Israel in conjunction with Palestinian organisations; mainly on the 
left. These Israelis were marginalised and ostracized in their society and 
therefore are brought here not as a recognition for their impact, but rather 
to the immense difficulty in constructing  such a model after 1948.  
The best way of illuminating their model is by providing a prosopography 
of their political biographies.  They all regarded themselves as anti Zionists 
although they usually began their political career as very devoted Zionists, 
many of them fought with the Jewish forces in 1948, in the Israeli army and 
even in the security or other government establishment before they all 
went through a certain moment of truth, an epiphany, that opened their 
eyes and pushed out the tribe’s boundaries. They included people such as 
Maxim Gilan, Israel Shahak and Akiva Or . Their life stories indicate they 
were individualistic, marginalised and Quixotic in many ways.16  
There were two ways of becoming a Jewish anti-Zionist in the state of 
Israel. You either left the tribe of Zionism because you witnessed a 
particular behaviour in the name of Zionism which was so abhorrent that it 
made you rethink the validity of the ideology that licensed such brutality; 
or, alternatively, you were a thinker by profession or inclination who did 
not cease to ponder and revisit the concepts and precepts of Zionism and it 
was their internal paradoxes and absurdities that gradually drifted you 
away towards a more universal and far more anti-Zionist, position in life. 
Israel Shahak was one such person. The fusion of nationalism and religion 
was a lethal combination which reminded Shahak of the policies that 
trampled his life in Nazi occupied Poland where he was born and from 
where he escaped to Palestine in 1948.   
This combination of disgust by the way Arabs were treated in the state and 
intellectual rejection of the very logic of the dogma motivated this unique 
group. For one it was the way Palestinian prisoners were treated in front of 
his eyes; for another it was encountering the daily interpretations of the 
Jewish rabbinical laws in the newly founded Israel and being distressed by 
the specific way it was applied towards, or should we say against, non-Jews, 
namely the Palestinian citizens. 
The political home for these early Jewish doubters of Zionism in Israel was 
the Communist party, but soon most of them left it, either continuing 
individually or within new small outfits, which eventually sought alliances 
with the PLO, and in particular with Left wing factions in it such as the 
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine.  Any such action was 
treated in Israel as high treason, and hence, most of these activists paid a 
very high price. Maxim Gilan was arrested for exposing the Israeli 
involvement in the assassination of Mahdi Ben Barka, the leader of the 
Moroccan opposition in 1966 for which he set in jail for a quite a long time.  
Others too were treated in a similar way. Such was fate of Michael 
Warshavski, Uri Davis and Udi Adiv to mention but few. 
Most of them left Israel in 1972, when Golda Meir was the Prime Minister 
and when they thought there was no hope whatsoever for change.  They 
developed false hopes of an imminent change when the Oslo accord was 
signed in 1993 only to be disillusioned about the ability of Israel to change 
or transform itself. 
All these brave people were introduced into the Israeli public arena after 
the 1967 war and sounded even more relevant after the outbreak of the 
first Intifada in 1987. Their actions of these lone riders was accompanied 
and in many ways complimented by a more systemized and organised 
effort. Small outfits appeared proclaiming themselves as anti-Zionist. 
Foremost among them was Matzpen (Compass in Hebrew). It was formed 
in 1962 by four members: Moshe Mahover, Akiva Or, Oded Pilevski and 
Yirmiyahu Kaplan who were thrown out from the Israeli communist party 
for their criticism of the party’s unconditional support for the USSR and 
demanded an open democratic discussion in the party about it.  
If you read the personal memoirs of some of the founders of Matzpen you 
can see that the personal narrative has always a formative event.  For Akiva 
Or it was a brutal break out of a sailors’ strike by the Israeli TUC; for Michel 
Warshavski, Mikado, it was the expulsion of the villages near Latrun in 
1967.   
There is a fascinating website in Hebrew where most living members of the 
organization tell us why they became anti-Zionist.17 The formative event 
that sobers them up usually evolved around exposing Zionism as 
colonialism, Israel as an apartheid state, and America as an evil 
imperialism. Abigail Abarbanel recently induced a large number of Jews 
and Israeli to describe their trajectories which completes this dissident 
archive for future historians.18  
Matzpen was born, as a recent book put it, twice: Once in 1962 and then 
again in 1967.19 It was incarnated after the occupation as the main 
movement opposing it, before the cause was taken by a more mainstream 
Zionist movement Peace Now. Until that happened it was at the height of its 
popularity among the young Left (but was still included a mere few 
hundreds all in all of members and supporters). 
Those who remained in Mazpen with time developed close relationship 
with the Palestinian Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine 
manifested in a joint declaration of the two bodies calling for the replacing 
Israel with a federal socialist state with equal cultural and civil rights to all 
as part of larger regional transformation of the Middle East into a free 
socialist United States.  More specifically it called upon the government to 
withdraw unilaterally from the occupied 1967 territories.  It also took an 
active part in building the solidarity movement with the Palestinians in the 
western world.  In the 1980s it slowly dissipated:  each member choosing a 
different way forward until it disappeared totally. 
Whoever they were, and however they organised, they all failed politically 
to sway behind them any significant number of Jews and they were the first 
to learn, what others understood later, that challenging Zionism from 
within the Jewish society is a sisyphic and ungrateful mission.  
Not surprising some individual Jews caught in this kind of cooperation 
went as far as adopting the tactics of guerrilla warfare but they were a 
handful.  Mazpten disappeared in the early 1980s and the various groups 
succeeding it had only a very small number of Jews in them.  The model 
however of accepting the lead of the Palestinian struggle, even when the 
issue of who represents the Palestinians became blurred after Oslo, and 
still is, did serve a template for the non and anti-Zionist activists, most of 
them young people in this century. It was a model that followed White 
people’s action in South Africa within the ANC and not surprisingly is more 
generally connected to comparing Israel to Apartheid South Africa with all 
the inevitable consequences of such a comparison: including the emergence 
later on of the BDS strategy in the West.  
 
Finally, one can see how difficult it is to build a paradigm of collaboration in 
the struggle against oppression in Israel when academics are concerned. It 
was a rare breed before the 1990s, it became quite a phenomenon in the 
1990s described as the post-Zionist movement – where academics 
deconstructed all aspects of Zionism in the past and the present – and 
disappeared again after 2000. In many ways, Uri Davis, an anthropologist 
was the first to use his professional knowledge to challenge Zionism had on 
while joining officially the PLO as part of his collaboration (only one other 
Israeli Jew did it – Ilan Halevy). This was a break from the famous human 
rights fighter in Israel, Israel Shahak, who was a chemist who looked for 
way of struggling against oppression. He, by the way, was an actual seeker 
of the third space, condemning nationalism wherever he found it – which 
led to clash also with the PLO. 
 
Davis was one of the first to fuse his professional interest with his political 
commitment. He used his anthropological qualifications to expose the 
Apartheid nature of the state of Israel.20 In many ways he set an example 
for the next generation of how to confront professionally Zionism within 
the Israeli academia and in one’s own discipline – the inevitable price for 
which was losing his job in that academia (many years later, another 
anthropologist who deconstructed bravely the production of knowledge on 
Arabs, the Mizrahim and particular Bedouin Women, Smadar Lavi would 
suffer a similar fate).21 
 
You could teach sciences and hold anti-Zionist views but you could not 
teach Zionism as a dissident professional social or human scientist in the 
local universities.  Until Davis, also one could not question the scholarly 
quality of the critique on Zionism and dismiss it as purely political and 
ideological tracts. The value of the work of those who were tackling these 
issues outside the professional purview of the Israeli academia is that the 
academics who later revisited the same issues and topics as professionals, 
owe much to their courage and industrious labour as laymen and activists.  
In the 1990s, especially after the signing of the Oslo accord, for a moment it 
seemed many more academics in Israel were collaborating in the struggle 
in a similar way. But this is a false impression. After few years of daring to 
question basic truisms of Zionism in their academic work, the vast majority 
of these scholars retracted back to the warm embrace of the Zionist 
consensus.  
 
In the 21st century, the creation of thirdspace was noted away from direct 
activism or critical scholarship. In one particular area the first attempts 
were made to turn a kindergarten or a school into a temporary shared 
space. More often than not in surrounding which were not themselves 
transformed into thridspaces and the scholarship on these few institutions 
is split between those who see it as the precursor of a more fundamental 
change and those who alas predict its danger of being cast into historical 
oblivion.  
Other areas were such cohabitation was attempted with various degrees of 
success was gender activism. The split between a western orientated 
Feminist movement and a Mizrahi one (with a similar split within the 
Palestinian feminist activism – reflecting a larger one affecting feminism in 
the Arab world as a whole) testify to power of nationalism, ethnocentricity 
and the colonialist conditions over the urge to share spaces on the basis of 
gender. 
 
Conclusions 
 
I will not dwell too long on future paradigms. I will only comment that they 
are not necessarily emerging from an analysis of the past, but rather in the 
spirit of the thridspace basic human impulse are a living spatial experience 
that may clash with perceived or constructed definitions of human space. 
And by that I mean that on the ground, more often than not, in every 
localized and limited way, communities in Israel and Palestine desegregate 
an imposed segregated reality from above – through their schools, NGOS, 
business and sexual interests, sometime common criminal activity, 
intellectual and artistic ventures and almost engaging jointly in every other 
possible human interaction. Neither Zionism nor Palestinian nationalism 
favour these interactions. Nor do they have a chance to mature as long as 
Israeli occupation, colonization and ethnic cleansing continue.  But they 
may serve a 21st century model of cooperation of liberation not just of the 
land but also of the people. After all, the Arab world removed the shackles 
of colonialism in the 1950s but people only now are raging and acting for 
their own liberation, not just that of their lands. Palestine will not be a 
different case study in this zeitgeist of ours that reintegrates the individual 
and her freedoms into a world in which big ideologies of oppression and 
liberation seemed to dwarf and ignore.  
Palestinian refugees looking for life and not fearing this is a refutation of 
the right of return (Tawtin which mean in a derogative way naturalization 
in a host country where the refugees reside), Palestinian in Israel building a 
normal existence without being accused of (Tatbi’ which means 
normalization with the Zionist entity) and Palestinians under occupation 
refusing to give up the very small pleasure of life Israel constantly denies 
them are the harbingers of this other model that hopefully would come to 
our shores sooner rather than later.   
But more importantly than anything else in my mind and the condito sine 
qua non for a vibrant and vital thridspace is a Jewish Israeli 
acknowledgement that Zionism is a settler colonialist movement still busy 
these days in trying and complete the dispossession of Palestine and that a 
paradigm shift can only emerge in the camp of the coloniser and the 
occupier. The rest can only follow from such a historical moment; if it were 
ever to come.  
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